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This  discussion  will  be  focused  on  one  segment  of  our  income
maintenance  programs,  specifically  those  we  call  welfare  programs.
First,  I  will  review  some  of  the  social  and  economic  origins  of those
programs  and  describe  their  inadequacies.  I  will  then  specify  some
rules  which  may  be  useful  in  eliminating  "the  welfare  mess,"  and
briefly  evaluate  the  President's  proposed  Family  Assistance  Program
in terms  of those  rules.  Finally,  I will discuss changes  that passage  of
this legislation  may cause  in other income  maintenance  legislation  as
well as the  likely political  effects  of such changes.
Our story of welfare in the United States begins in the late eighteen
hundreds with  the passage  of relief  legislation  by a number  of states.
Such  legislation  was  typically  concerned  with  emergency  relief  in
periods  of economic  depression.  Gradually,  however,  these  programs
became  permanent.  Their  main  concern  was  to  assure  that  widows
with  children,  and  other  persons  who  could  be  certified  as  "deserv-
ing,"  were  provided  aid in periods  of  economic  distress.
The major welfare program  of our time, Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC),  was itself a product of one of those periods
of economic distress.  Passed  during the early period  of the New Deal,
it provided  regular income  assistance  to mothers with children.  When
15  million workers  were  unemployed,  it was  clear that mothers  with
small  children  would  not be  able  to  find  work.  They  required  assist-
ance,  and  AFDC  was  the answer.
However,  we were never very  happy  with the  idea of relief,  even
during the  worst of the  depression.  For most of us poverty  carried  an
implication  of laziness.  It still does,  and all our welfare  legislation  has
embodied  within  it  the  desire  to  help  those  who  cannot  help  them-
selves,  and the fear that  we will be "taken"  in the attempt.  The song,
"Welfare  Cadillac,"  is  a  popular  reflection  of  the  fear  that the  lazy
and  shiftless are  taking  advantage  of  that program.
It  should  not  surprise  us  that  the  programs  which  grew  out  of
these  conflicting  attitudes  contain  conflicts within  their own  program
structure  and  also are in  conflict  with other  income  maintenance  pro-
grams.
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1.  Persons  may be  eligible  for  AFDC  in  one  state,  or a  county
within the state,  and not be  considered eligible  in an adjoining
state  or even  an  adjoining county.
2.  Even  among program  eligibles,  benefit  levels  vary  as  much  as
50  percent within  states,  and 500  percent  between  states.
3.  The  system  subjects  its  beneficiaries  to  a  level  of  continuing
and  personal  observation  and  investigation  which  most  of  us
would  consider  socially  repugnant  and  personally  intolerable.
4.  The  program  serves  only  about one-third  of  all  those  who are
poor. The lowest paying states have the  largest number of poor
persons  and are  themselves  low per capita income  areas.  Thus,
taxes now being collected  and distributed through public  assist-
ance  in  these  states  represent  much  higher  levels  of  sacrifice
than  do high payments in  more  affluent  states.
5.  The  investigative  system  which  we  use  to guard  against  over-
payment  and  payment  to  ineligibles,  as  defined  locally,  is  so
inefficient  that nearly  one-fifth  of  total  program  expenditures
are  required  to  pay  for  administration  and  investigation.
These  are not,  however,  the most disastrous  effects  of the  system.
Those  who  receive  benefits  are  generally  subject  to  tax rates  on
earnings  which  are  usually equivalent  to  100  percent.  Thus,  the  sys-
tem  provides  no  monetary  incentive  for  anyone  receiving  benefits  to
work.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  more  thoroughgoing  mechanism  to
discourage  work.  Indeed,  what  is  surprising  is  that  many  welfare
recipients  do work  in  spite  of  the  perverse  incentive  structure  of  the
existing system.
The  system  provides  no  rewards  for  the  group  which would  gen-
erally be considered the most deserving  of all-male family heads who
work  40  hours  a week,  50  weeks  a  year,  but in  spite  of  their  work
efforts  remain poor.  Practically  this entire  working poor population  is
specifically  excluded  from any protection  by our welfare  system.
This  criticism  of  the  existing  welfare  system  could  continue  for
several  pages,  but  we  have  probably  gone  far  enough  to  agree  with
both Presidents  Johnson  and Nixon that the present welfare  system  is
a social, economic,  and political failure.
BASIC  RULES  FOR  AN  INCOME  MAINTENANCE  SYSTEM
This enumeration  of the faults  of the existing  system  can  help  us
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system  should  do.  I have  tried to profit  from the  program  failures  of
the existing  system  in specifying  five  basic  rules  for  designing  an  in-
come maintenance  system.  They are:
1.  Income  inadequacy  is  a national  problem,  and  given  the  will
to seek solutions to that problem,  the answers  must be national
in scope rather than state or local.
2.  Whatever  system  is  chosen as  the "solution,"  it should provide
clear and  consistent incentives  for work and  self-improvement.
3.  The  chosen  design  should  guarantee  administrative  efficiency.
4.  Acceptance of benefits  should not be conditioned  on the accept-
ance of  a degraded  status  within  the community.
5.  The  system should conform to the rule of law. Eligibility,  bene-
fit levels,  rights,  and obligations  must all  be specific  and  objec-
tive-not  dependent  upon  the  attitude  or  authority  of
bureaucrats.  This is really very  simple  and very  important.  So-
ciety can perhaps best be judged by whether it provides socially
defined  equity  in  an  impersonal  and  uniform  manner.  When
we begin  to deviate  from such norms,  the citizen  loses faith in
his  government.  When  deviation  is widespread,  every man  be-
comes  a "hustler"  and every  other man  his  game.
This is  all that  an  income  maintenance  system  should  try  to do.
It cannot prevent  what may  be regarded  as  immoral behavior  and  it
should  not try to. We  cannot  use an  income maintenance  program  to
inflict  punishment  for illegitimacy.  That problem-if  it  is  a problem
-must  be  solved  by  other  methods.  Penalizing  the  child  for  the
"sins"  of the mother  will  not reduce  the number  of  illegitimate  chil-
dren or feed those  who already  exist.
Neither can an income maintenance  system substitute  for adequate
job opportunities.  Providing incentives  to work  will  be  useless  unless
work is available.
We  must  not  put  a  penalty  on  internal  migration  by  declaring
persons  ineligible  for  welfare  who  have  not lived  within  local  juris-
dictions  a specified  period.  A person  who moves  to New  York  from
Mississippi  does  so  because  he  believes  that  work  opportunities,  or
schools,  or welfare is "better"  there. That  is a right guaranteed  by the
Constitution,  and  it is  a right  which forms  the bedrock  of  the theory
of free enterprise.  A law  or an institution  which is  acceptable  only  so
long as no one seeks its protection  is a poor law.
We  have  listed  five  rules  as  the basis  of program  design  for  in-
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with  regard  to  decisions  determining  the  source  of  program  funding
and its administration.
If,  for  instance,  we  agree  that  income  inadequacy  is  a  national
problem,  then the burden of that problem should be national  in scope.
This  conclusion  argues  strongly  that  program  funding  should  be  na-
tional rather  than  state  or local.  The burdens  and  benefits  of such  a
program  are bound  to  be  unequal,  but  the only  way of  insuring  that
they  are  not  disproportionally  unequal  is  to  fund  such  programs  on
the  federal level-preferably  from  general  revenue  sources.
The same  rationale applies  (although with less force)  to the  ques-
tion  of benefit  levels.  Income  support  for  a given level  of  income  in-
adequacy  should be the same in Alabama,  or Colorado,  or New York.
Differences  in  the  "cost  of  living,"  which  argue  for  payment
differentials,  are not so wide  as is normally  assumed.  Furthermore,  no
agency  professes  competence  to  suggest  what those  differences  might
in  actuality  be.  Finally,  the payment  of  a  high  benefit  in  high  cost
areas  provides  strong incentives  for people  to  move there.  The  result
if such movement is  to further clog our metropolitan  areas with those
least equipped  to deal with urban life.
The  application  of the rule  that our program  should  be  national,
combined  with  acceptance  of  the  rule  of  impersonal  and  uniform
application-the  rule  of law-calls for  uniform  rules  and  regulations
of program eligibility  throughout the  states.
Insistence  on  this  point  probably  requires  that  the  program  be
administered  at the state  or federal  level.  (I  take it as  given  that  such
a  program  should  be  administered  under  a  strong  civil  service  pro-
gram,  so  that  political  pressure  cannot  pervert  the  system  to  reward
the  politically  deserving.)  Given  the  acceptance  of  these  programs
specifics,  I am  not all that concerned  whether the  administrative  offi-
cials  are  state  or  federal  employees.  My  personal  preference  would
probably  be  for  federal  administration.  Individual  experience  with
federal  officialdom  may  not  have been  altogether  a  happy  one,  but
state  bureaucracies  seem  even  less  responsive  to  the average  citizen.
So  much  for  the  theory  of  what  would be  done  if  we,  who  are
logical,  rational men  and women  were  in  power instead of the politi-
cians.  The  facts  of  the  matter  are  of  course  that  the politicians  are
not  so  irrational  as  they  might  appear  to  be,  nor  even  so  irrational
as it is comforting to  believe when  they turn  down  or, worse,  will  not
even  hear  out  one  of  our  pet  proposals.  The  politician  must  make
reasonably  certain  not just that  he  will  get re-elected,  but  if  he  is  a
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somewhat  better  and  not  worse.  That  rule  alone  would  consign  at
least half of  all academically  conceived  plans  to  the trash  bin.
Given  that  modest  requirement-not  to  reach  perfection,  but
merely  to  achieve  sufficient  reform  to  redirect  the program  with  rea-
sonable  assurance  that  the  system  will  be  better,  that  it  will begin  to
move toward our five  enumerated  goals-where  do we  go from here?
THE  FAMILY  ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM
The proposed Family Assistance  Program,  which has been passed
by the  House of Representatives  and  is  now being  considered  by  the
Senate Finance Committee,  is,  I think, where we  should go.
This does not mean that it is without fault.  It does not sufficiently
reward  work  effort.  It does  retain  a mix  of  local,  state,  and  federal
programs.  It does mix  other goals-child care  and work  compulsion
-with  the income assistance  goal. It does have these and other faults.
Even so, it is clearly  a revolutionary  program.  It is  perhaps  the  most
revolutionary  program  since  the establishment  of  the  federal  income
tax amendment.  It promises  to be  at  least  as far  reaching  in effect  as
the Social Security Act.
The  bill of course could  be,  and  may  be,  improved  before  it  be-
comes  law. In particular,  it might be desirable to specify a phasing out
of the food  stamp  portion  of  the proposal in three  to five  years.  The
work  test  might  be  made  more  specific  and  thus  less  subject  to  the
peculiarities of local officialdom and local prejudice.  Raising the basic
benefit  for  a family  of four  from $1,600  to  $2,000  a year would  re-
lieve much of the pressure  on local  and state authorities  to maintain an
inefficient  and  regressive  supplementary  system.
There  are  other  provisions  in  the  bill  which  also  should  be
changed,  but are  less likely  to receive  much  attention.  The  child care
provisions represent  essentially romantic rather than technical answers
to the problem  of the working mother.  The exemption of the first $60
per month of earnings provides  special work incentives  most likely  to
be felt  among  families  with  a  secondary  family  worker,  not  among
families  with  a single  worker who  is  already on  a job.
How does the bill stack up against  our five  rules?
1.  A  national  rather  than  state  or  local  system.  The  bill  com-
promises this rule.  It abolishes the traditional "matching  form-
ulas" under AFDC and puts in  its place  a national  system with
uniform  payments  with  uniform  rules.  It  excludes,  however,
families  without  children  and  continues  partial  support  of
state  and local  supplementary  welfare  systems.
692.  Clear and consistent incentives  for work and self-improvement.
The  bill  again  compromises  the  rule.  Although  consistent  in-
centives  are  provided  in  the  bill,  persons  now  receiving  state
assistance  and  receiving  food  stamps  as  well  retain  very  little
in the  way  of  "clear"  incentives,  since  an  increase  in  income
will  reduce  their welfare  by  82  percent of  the  increase.
3.  Administrative  efficiency.  The  Family  Assistance  Program
comes  close  to our  rule  in  this  area.  Eligibility  will  be  deter-
mined on the basis  of client application  which will be validated
by  spot  checking  similar  to that  of the  Internal  Revenue  Ser-
vice.  An  element  of  compromise  is,  however,  introduced  by
continuing  program  operations  of  the  Department  of  Health,
Education,  and  Welfare  rather  than  transferring  them  to  the
Internal  Revenue  Service,  which  would  be  more  efficient.
4.  Benefits  established  without  degradation.  The  law  as  written
specifies  benefits  under  the  Family  Assistance  Program  as  a
matter  of right, not  at the  pleasure  of bureaucratic  determina-
tion of "deserving."
5.  Uniformity-the  rule of the law.  The bill  is rigid in  its require-
ment  that benefits  and  obligations  be  the  same  throughout  the
country.
The  bill  is,  therefore,  not  all  we  might hope  for,  but  in  terms  of
the general  quality of such legislation,  it is  much better than we might
expect.  It  represents  a  strong  and  important  movement  toward  the
rationalization  of  national  income  maintenance  legislation.  That  re-
direction,  in  my view,  outweighs  the bill's defects.
The argument  has up  to  this point  been  concerned  almost  exclu-
sively  with  the  AFDC  program  and  its  proposed  replacement,  the
Family  Assistance  Program.  We  have  not  discussed  the  retirement
program  under  the Social  Security Act,  nor have  we  analyzed  income
maintenance  in  terms  of Unemployment  Insurance,  or Veterans  Dis-
ability Pension  programs.  These programs  are  most  certainly  part  of
the  income  maintenance  program  structure  in  the United  States  and
affect  and  will  be  affected  by  the  Family  Assistance  Program.  How-
ever,  no  pressing  public  policy  decision  is  pending  with  regard  to
these programs. This  does not mean that they will  continue  as discrete
and independent programs.  In fact,  I am  certain that the "solution"  of
the problem  of income inadequacy  by the Family Assistance Program
will force  a re-examination  and  restructuring  of  these  complementary
income  maintenance  programs.
I  would  even  be  willing  to  suggest  that  the  Family  Assistance
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increased to the point that minimum  wage  legislation  may become  a
dead letter.
Finally,  I would  point out that  many  serious  analysts  and policy
makers  are  very  unhappy  with  the  general  agricultural  support  pro-
grams,  particularly  the  cotton  and  wheat  programs.  These  policy
makers  are  beginning  to  ask  why  the  income  assistance  elements  of
such programs cannot be served by a general income maintenance  pro-
gram like the Family Assistance Program. This suggests  the cotton and
wheat programs  may not be  "long  for the world."
Earlier in this article I have called the Family Assistance Program
a revolutionary  program.  That  description  does not,  however,  appear
to  be  justified  by  the  bill  itself.  It  does  substantially  broaden  the
population  eligible  for work  related  income  assistance  and  will  as  a
consequence  of that  action,  increase  the  number  of beneficiaries  from
4.5 million to about 20 million,  and that is  a very considerable  accom-
plishment.  It  does provide  a more  adequate  work incentive  structure
than  existing  law,  and  that  is  also  important.  The  revolutionary  na-
ture  of  the  program,  however,  is determined  by  the  forces  which  its
enactment will undoubtedly  set into motion.
The Senate Finance Committee pointed out that the bill  as written
did  not provide  clear  work incentives  for  persons  who  received  food
stamp  benefits,  were  public  housing  beneficiaries,  or  were  protected
by Medicaid.
The administration  responded  to this  criticism  by eliminating  the
existing schedule  of benefits  under the food stamp  and public housing
programs  and  replacing  them  with  schedules  which  meshed  with  the
Family Assistance  Program  itself,  and  in  addition  specified  that  the
food  stamp  program  be  transferred  from  the  Department  of  Agri-
culture  to  the  Department  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare.  This
latter step  will permit the food stamp  program  to  be  administered  in
concert  with the  Family Assistance  Program.  Applicants  will  be  able
to indicate  the  desired  level  of food  stamps at  the same  time  they file
for Family Assistance  Program benefits.
More important  than either  of  these  steps  was  the  administration
proposal  to  replace  the  Medicaid  program  with  a  comprehensive
medical  care  program  for  Family  Assistance  Program  beneficiaries
plus many millions  of other families not eligible for the Family Assist-
ance  Program.  The  administration  has  promised  to  submit  the  de-
tailed legislation package  for this program  by February  15,  1971.  The
preliminary  statement  regarding  the  medical  care  program  has  not
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some  30 million  Americans.
I have already  suggested  that enactment  of the  Family Assistance
Program  may  lead  to  a  total restructuring  of the  Social  Security  re-
tirement  program  and  various  agricultural  support  programs,  but
even  these  changes  might not  justify use  of the  word  "revolutionary"
to  describe  the  effects  of  the  proposed  program.  I  am  confident  that
income  protection under  the  Family  Assistance  Program  will  be  en-
larged, probably within  two or three years,  to  provide  income  protec-
tion for all persons under  65, whether  or not they  live in families  with
children.  The history of the Social  Security Act provides  an analogous
example  of program  expansion.  I would  not be  at all  surprised  if  the
basic  benefit  also rises  rapidly.  It is not  too  much  to  hope  that  basic
benefit levels may equal the poverty  line before the end of the decade.
The  economic  effects  of  a  program  like  the  Family  Assistance
Program  are  reasonably  certain.  Most  of  the  money  will  go  to  the
South-because  that  is  where  most  of  the  poor  live.  This  will,  of
course,  enormously  strengthen  consumer markets.  The  sales  of  shoes
and food  and paint  and,  yes,  television  sets  will increase.  This  is  why
I think  the  National  Association  of Manufacturers  supports  the pro-
gram.  It  will  also increase  the cost  of  domestic  labor.  This,  I  think,
is the  heart of the reason why  the chambers  of commerce  in the  South
have opposed  the  program.  I  suspect that  the majority  of  the  people
will vote for higher  consumption  and higher  sales  even  in  the face  of
higher wages.
Rising  wages  and  spendable  income,  which  will  rise  even  in  the
absence  of higher wages,  will undoubtedly  affect  the course of political
life  as  well.  A  population  dependent  on  others  for  the  necessities  of
life  is  politically  dependent.  The  Family  Assistance  Program  will
seriously erode  the  foundations  of such dependence.  Political  changes
of startling dimensions  may follow.
This paper  has perhaps  given  insufficient  attention  to the force  of
the "Protestant  Ethic" in determining  the character  and  substance  of
our income  maintenance  legislation.  There is,  after all,  a strong belief
(and  this  belief  is  strongly  reinforced  by  general  prosperity)  that
anyone  can  "make  it"  in America  if he  works  hard.  This belief  is  at
the  heart of our  fears that malingering  and laziness  are the root prob-
lem of many welfare  recipients.
I  do not  doubt  the  emotional  force  of  the  argument.  There  are
undoubtedly  thousands  who  cheat the welfare  authorities.  There  may
even  by  a few  "welfare  Cadillacs,"  even  as  there  are bank  presidents
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us all by not paying their income tax.
It  is,  I think, more  important  to provide  a rational  and  adequate
system  for families  headed  by  a  male  working  a full  year,  full  time,
who are poor in spite of it all. A society  that worries  about the  2  or 3
percent  of  welfare  recipients  who  get  benefits  though  technically  in-
eligible,  while disregarding  the needs  of  the working  poor,  has  mis-
placed  its  concern.  A  defense  of  such  inequitable  treatment  on  the
grounds that  general  income  assistance  will  ruin the  nation's  "moral
fiber"  seriously  misunderstands  the nature  of  morality  and  the work
ethic.
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